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I. Introduction 
 
In 1971 a conference was held in Victoria, the capital of British Columbia, between 
the federal government and the governments of the ten Canadian provinces. This 
conference produced what became known as the Victoria Charter which sought, inter 
alia, to establish a formula for amending the Canadian constitution without requiring 
the unanimous consent of the legislatures of all the ten Canadian provinces.  
 According to this charter the federal government, as well as any province 
having or having ever had 25 percent of the Canadian population, would be able to 
veto any proposed constitutional amendment – thereby awarding veto powers also to 
the provinces of Quebec and Ontario. In order for a proposed amendment to pass it 
would have to be ratified not only by the federal government and by the legislatures 
of Quebec (Q) and Ontario (O), but also by the legislatures of at least four additional 
provinces – two of which must belong to the Atlantic region, and the remaining two 
must belong to the West region and contain at least 50% of the population of the 
Western provinces.1 
 The Victoria Charter failed to pass because although it was ratified by all other 
Canadian provinces, the premier of Quebec at that time, Robert Bourassa, stalled and 
rejected it. Eleven more years elapsed until in 1982 the Canada Act passed specifying 
the conditions for amending the Canadian constitution – according to which no 
province has veto power. Nevertheless, the proposed rule for amending the Canadian 
constitution according to the 1971 Victoria Charter is of special interest to voting-
power scholars for several reasons: 
 
•  It is the most well-known, perhaps so far the only, real-life decision rule 
demonstrating lack of co-monotonicity between the Shapley–Shubik (1954) and 
Banzhaf (1965) indices of a priori voting power – thereby proving that these indices 
cannot be considered as measuring the same thing. It is also a real-life example 
(which has not been used so far in the literature) for demonstrating the violation of the 
added blocker postulate (ABP) by the Shapley-Shubik index – thereby casting serious 
doubt on the reasonableness of this index. (ABP is discussed below in section III). 
 
• The voting-power exact calculations associated with the Victoria Charter must be 
performed manually because, so far, there exists no online automatic program that can 
perform these calculations. Since, as far as I know, only the final results of these 
calculations have appeared in the literature,2 and as these calculations are rather 
                                                 
1  There are four provinces belonging to the Atlantic (A) region (New Brunswick, Prince Edward 
Island, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland), and four provinces belonging to the Western region (Manitoba, 
Saskatchewan, Alberta, British Columbia). The population of British Columbia and that of any one of 
the other three Western provinces (which are called in the sequel the Prairie [P] provinces) constituted 
at least 50% of the populations of all the four Western provinces; similarly, the populations of all the 
three prairie provinces also constituted at least 50% of the populations of all the four Western 
provinces.  Thus although British Columbia was not awarded veto power, it was awarded, according to 
both the Banzhaf (Bz) and the Shapley–Shubik (S-S) indices, voting power which was equal to the sum 
of voting powers of all the other three prairie provinces.  
 
2  D.R. Miller (1973) published the voting-power results of the Canadian provinces under the Victoria 
Charter only according to the Shapley–Shubik index, while Straffin (1977) published these results also 
according to the Banzhaf index – and thus was able to point out that these two indices were not co-
monotonic. 
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elaborate, it seems to me useful to outline them in detail – at least as a supplement to 
voting-power teaching modules. 
 
II. The Detailed Calculations  
 
The decision rule for amending the Canadian constitution according to the 1971 
Victoria Charter can be represented either as a single unweighted voting game,3 or as 
the meet of two weighted voting games,4 but not as a single weighted voting game. In 
order to compare the relative regional voting powers according to the Victoria 
Charter, I shall first ignore the veto power of the Canadian federal government and 
consider only the votes of the ten Canadian provinces. Table 1 lists the 12 types of 
possible vulnerable coalitions (i.e., winning coalitions containing at least one critical 
member). This table lists, for each type of winning coalition, the number of ways it 
can be formed and the number of times each of the various provinces is critical.  
 Thus, for example, winning coalitions of Type #1 consist of six provinces: 
British Columbia (BC), one prairie (1P) province (i.e., Alberta, Saskatchewan, or 
Manitoba), Ontario (O), Quebec (Q), and two of the four Atlantic (2A) provinces 
(New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland). Because there 
are six possibilities for choosing two out of the four Atlantic provinces and three 
possibilities for choosing one out of the three prairie provinces, there are altogether 18 
(= 6 × 3) possible winning coalitions of Type #1. BC, O, and Q are critical in all of 
them, each of the prairie provinces is critical in six of them, and each of the Atlantic 
provinces is critical in nine of them. 
 Similarly, winning coalitions of Type #2 consist of seven provinces: British 
Columbia (BC), two prairie provinces (2P), Ontario (O), Quebec (Q), and two 
Atlantic provinces (2A). Because there are six possibilities for choosing two out of the 
four Atlantic provinces and three possibilities for choosing two out of the three prairie 
provinces, there are altogether 18 (= 6 × 3) possible winning coalitions of Type #2. 
BC, O, and Q are critical in all of them, none of  the prairie provinces is critical in any 
of them, and each of the Atlantic provinces is critical in nine of them. 
 The calculations pertaining to winning coalitions of Types #3-12 are 
conducted similarly.  
                                                 
3  The decision rule according to the Victoria Charter cannot be represented as a single weighted voting 
game because it is not trade robust (cf. Taylor and Zwicker, 1992; 1999, ch. 2). A simple voting game 
is not trade robust if it is possible to list two or more winning coalitions and then move players (voters) 
from one winning coalition to another until all of them become losing coalitions. Thus, for example, 
according to the Victoria Charter decision rule one winning coalition is U = {Ontario, Quebec, New 
Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Alberta, British Columbia} and another winning coalition is V = {Ontario, 
Quebec, Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland,  Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba}. However, if one 
moves Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland from coalition V to U and British Columbia from 
coalition U to V, then one obtains two new coalitions, U’ and V’, respectively, both of which are 
losing.. 
 
4 If we assign weight 5 to each of Quebec and Ontario, weight 2 to British Columbia, and weight 1 to 
each of the remaining seven provinces, the Victoria Charter decision rule can be represented as the 
meet of the following two 5-player weighted (and proper) voting games: [7; 5,1,1,1,1] × [8; 5,2,1,1,1]. I 
thank Moshé Machover for this idea. Straffin (1988, p. 73) gives the meet of the following two 4-
player weighted games [2; 1,1,1,1] × [3; 2,1,1,1] as an example where the Shapley–Shubik and 
Banzhaf indices are not co-monotonic. Except for the absence of the two veto-wielding provinces, this 
example is similar to the Victoria Charter example. However, note that the first weighted game in 
Straffin’s example is improper.  
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TABLE 1: Possible Winning Coalitions According to the Victoria Charter 
(1) 
Type 
(2) 
Possible 
Winning 
Coalition 
(3) 
No. of 
Provinces 
(4) 
No. of 
Ways 
Can Be 
Formed 
(5) 
No. 
Times 
BC is 
Critical 
(6) 
No. 
Times 
each P is 
Critical 
(7) 
No. Times O 
and Q are 
Critical 
(8) 
No. Times 
each A is 
Critical 
1 BC + 1P + O 
+ Q + 2A 
6 18 18 6 18 9 
2 BC + 2P + O 
+ Q + 2A 
7 18 18 – 18 9 
3 3P + O + Q + 
2A 
7 6 – 6 6 3 
4 BC + 1P + O 
+ Q + 3A 
7 12 12 4 12 – 
5 BC + 3P + O 
+ Q + 2A 
8 6 – – 6 3 
6 BC + 2P + O 
+ Q + 3A 
8 12 12 – 12 – 
7 3P + O + Q + 
3A 
8 4 – 4 4 – 
8 BC + 1P + O 
+ Q + 4A 
8 3 3 1 3 – 
9 BC + 3P + O 
+ Q + 3A 
9 4 – – 4 – 
10 BC + 2P + O 
+ Q + 4A 
9 3 3 – 3 – 
11 3P + O + Q + 
4A 
9 1 – 1 1 – 
12 BC + 3P + O 
+ Q + 4A 
10 1 – – 1 – 
Total   88 66 22 88 24 
Legend: 
BC = British Columbia; P = prairie province, one of Alberta, Saskatchewan, or Manitoba; O = Ontario; 
Q = Quebec; A = Atlantic province, one of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, or 
Newfoundland. 
Source: Columns (1)-(4) in this table are taken from D.R. Miller (1973, Table I, p. 141).  
 
The relative Banzhaf (Bz) index of every province according to the Victoria Charter is 
equal to the number of times the province is critical divided by the sum of critical 
occasions of all the 10 provinces.5 As can be seen from Table 1, this sum is equal to 
404 = [66 + (22×3) + (88×2) + (24×4)]. Hence the Bz index of British Columbia is 
66/404 = 0.1634, the Bz index of each of the three prairie provinces is 22/404 = 
0.0545, the Bz index of Ontario and of Quebec is 88/404 = 0.2178, and the Bz index 
of each of the four Atlantic provinces is 24/404 = 0.0594. 
 To calculate the Shapley-Shubik (S-S) index of every province one proceeds 
as follows.6 For every province one looks at each type of coalition in which the 
province is critical and then compute the following product: C × (M-1)! × (10 – M)! 
where C is the number of times the province is critical and M is the number of 
                                                 
5  This index appears in the 1965 article by John F. Banzhaf. The Bz index values of the 10 Canadian 
provinces according to the Victoria Charter calculated below agree with those reported by Straffin 
(1977, p. 110) and later by Kilgour and Levesque (1984, p. 468). 
 
6  This index appears in the 1954 article by Lloyd S. Shapley and Martin Shubik. The S-S index values 
of the 10 Canadian provinces according to the Victoria Charter calculated below agree with those 
reported by D.R. Miller (1973, p. 142) and later by Straffin (1977, p. 110). 
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coalition members in the given type. Thereafter one sums the results of these products 
over all types in which the province is critical and divide the outcome by 10!. 
 
Thus the S-S index of BC is: [18(5!4!) + 18(6!3!) + 12(6!3!) + 12(7!2!) + 3(7!2!) + 
3(8!1!)] / 10! = 453,600 / 10! = 0.125. 
 
The S-S index of each of the three prairie provinces is: [6(5!4!) + 6(6!3!) + 4(6!3!) + 
4(7!2!) + (7!2!) + (8!1!)] / 10! = 151,200 / 10! = 0.0417. 
 
The S-S index of Ontario and of Quebec is: [18(5!4!) + 18(6!3!) + 6(6!3!) + 12((6!3!) 
+ 6(7!2!) + 12(7!2!) + 4(7!2!) + 3(7!2!) +4(8!1!) +3(8!1!) +(8!1!) +(9!0!)] /10! = 
1,144,800 / 10! = 0.3155. 
 
And the S-S index of each of the four Atlantic provinces is: [9(5!4!) + 9(6!3!) + 
3(6!3!) + 3(7!2!)] / 10! = 108,000 / 10! = 0.0298. 
 
Note that according to the Bz index the a priori (relative) voting power of each of the 
Atlantic provinces is (slightly) larger than that of each of the prairie provinces (0.0594 
> 0.0545), whereas according to the S-S index the a priori (relative) voting power of 
each prairie province is (considerably) larger than that of each of the Atlantic 
provinces (0.0417 > 0.0298) – thus demonstrating that in unweighted simple voting 
games the Bz and S-S indices are not necessarily co-monotonic.7  
 
III. Violation of the Added Blocker Postulate (ABP) by the S-S Index 
 
Now let us examine what would be the ratios between the (relative) voting powers of 
the various provinces if one takes into consideration the fact that the Canadian federal 
government (F), too, was awarded the right to veto any proposed constitutional 
amendment according to the Victoria Charter. In this case one must add F to each of 
the 12 possible types of winning coalitions listed in column (2) of Table 1, increase by 
1 each of the entries in column (3) and add F also to the heading of column (7) in this 
table.  
 As a result of this change the denominator of the Bz index (i.e., the total 
number of critical occasions over all provinces) would increase by 88 (from 404 to 
492), but as the number of times each province is critical remains the same, the Bz 
index of all provinces would decrease but the ratios between the Bz indices of the 
various provinces would remain unchanged.  
 However, ratios between the S-S indices of the various provinces would 
change as a result of adding the federal government as a veto player (or blocker). This 
is so because, for each type of winning coalition, the total number of coalition 
members (M) increases by 1, and the total number of players in this voting game 
increases from 10 to 11. So the ratios between the new factorial products changes and 
one obtains that: 
 
The S-S index of BC is: [18(6!4!) + 18(7!3!) + 12(7!3!) + 12(8!2!) + 3(8!2!) + 
3(9!1!)] / 11! = 3,516,480 / 11! = 0.0881. 
 
 The S-S index of each of the three prairie provinces is: [6(6!4!) + 6(7!3!) + 4(7!3!) + 
                                                 
7  The Bz and S-S indices are always co-monotonic in weighted simple voting games.  
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4(8!2!) + (8!2!) + (9!1!)] / 11! = 1,172,160 / 11! = 0.0294 
 
The S-S index of Ontario, Quebec and the Canadian federal government (F) is: 
[18(6!4!) + 18(7!3!) + 6(7!3!) + 12((7!3!) + 6(8!2!) + 12(8!2!) + 4(8!2!) + 3(8!2!) 
+4(9!1!) +3(9!1!) +(9!1!) +(10!0!)] /11! = 9,947,520 / 11! = 0.2492. 
 
And the S-S index of each of the four Atlantic provinces is: [9(6!4!) + 9(7!3!) + 
3(7!3!) + 3(8!2!)] / 11! = 760,320 / 11! = 0.0190. 
 
So, for example, we obtain that according to the S-S index the voting power of each 
prairie province is 1.3993 (= 0.0417 / 0.0298) larger than that of each Atlantic 
province when one ignores the Canadian federal government as a veto player, but the 
voting power of each prairie province becomes 1.5474 (= 0.0294 / 0.0190) larger than 
that of every Atlantic province when, ceteris paribus, one adds the Canadian federal 
government as a veto player. Felsenthal and Machover (1998, pp. 266-267) viewed 
this phenomenon as a serious violation by the S-S index of a compelling postulate 
they called the added blocker postulate (ABP),8 which does not only lead to different 
conclusions than those arrived at according to the Bz index due to their lack of co-
monotonicity, but also casts serious doubts as to the reasonableness of the S-S index 
as a voting-power measure. 
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